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Dynamical Similarity and the Problem of Evil 
Brad]. Kallenberg 
Discussions of evil commonly fault God for not "doing some-
thing." Defenders of God respond that God had good reasons for 
not "doing something." Detractors observe that if a human being 
can snatch the toddler from the path of the oncoming bus, why 
does not God snatch the bus from the path of the oncoming tod-
dler? The underlying assumption in such discussions is that God's 
"doing something" is similar to humans' "doing something. " 1 
If human beings bear the image of their Creator as the Abra-
hamic faiths maintain, it is natural to suppose that divine action 
is similar to human action. But what sort of similarity is in play? 
That more than one kind of similarity can be brought to bear is 
often overlooked. 
The everyday garden variety of similarity may be illustrated by 
imagining two congruent triangles: 
A glance will show that that the triangles are similar because 
their corresponding angles are the same. And though the sides are 
of different lengths, they are correspondingly proportional: if the 
bottom side of the smaller triangle is half that of the larger, then 
its other two sides will also be half the length of their counter-
parts. Here the simple scale is 1:2. The units of measurement are 
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unimportant. Whether one measures in inches or centimeters, the 
same ratio always holds. In other words, "4 in. to 8 in." constitutes 
a ratio of 1:2 as does "10.1 em. to 20.2 em." Because the units 
of dimension drop out when the scale is calculated, this kind of 
similarity has been called "dimensionless similarity." 
When atheistic philosophers of religion complain that God 
failed to "do something" about instances of gratuitous evil,2 they 
imagine the kind of divine agency being debated is a scaled-up 
version of human action: God's action (should God exist) is similar 
to human action only bigger, stronger, faster. The employment of 
dimensionless similarity is a bewitching conceptual mismove that 
perpetuates both theological and philosophical confusion. 
At least as early as Augustine, Christians noted that there can 
be no proportion between God and creatures. 3 Of course, athe-
ist philosophers of religion cannot be held to Christian dogmas. 
But the underlying confusion is also philosophical. The Christia~ 
notion of God cannot be arrived at by a strategy that presumes di-
mensionless similarity (i.e., numerical proportion) and then adjusts 
the scale to account for an "infinite" term. Fortunately, the kind 
of modeling that relies upon dimensionless similarity is not the 
only kind of modeling human beings can employ. Unfortunately, 
however, the notion that may assist in the problem of evil is .not 
one that can simply be snipped out of one context and pasted into 
theodical discussion. It is a technical term, one on the same level 
of complexity as "partial differential equation" or "myocardial 
infarction." As such it must be seen against the backdrop of its 
use-in-practice to get the point. 
Two Types of Modeling 
One of the ways human beings come to know their world-
perhaps the primary way-is through model-making. Modeling 
comes in all shapes and varieties, some linguistic, some mathemati-
cal, some mechanical, some conceptual. Despite the breadth of 
diversity, instances of modeling comprise two distinct .families: 
semantic and syntactical. In the next section I will describe both 
kinds of modeling and contrast their attending concepts of simi-
larity as found in Wittgenstein's thought.4 
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Semantic Modeling 
Semantic models are definitional by nature; once the relevant 
definitions are learned, the model can be comprehended. The 
easiest illustration of a semantic model is a roadmap. Roadmaps 
are scale pictures of select features of the landscape: roads, rivers, 
some important buildings. What makes roadmaps useable is their 
dimensionless similarity. In the case of maps, this kind of similarity 
has four features. First, all the angles are preserved: a right-angle 
junction of two lines on the road map corresponds with a right-
angle turn by the driver. Second, relative position is preserved: the 
four edges of the page correspond to four points of the compass 
(and not, say, its mirror image!). Third, the mapping is univocal: 
each point on the map correlates to a single location in the land-
scape. Finally, relative distances are preserved by means of a single 
rule of translation (e.g., 1 inch=1 mile). Importantly, the rule of 
translation can be transformed into a numerical scale. If one mile 
is 5,280 feet and one foot has twelve inches, then one inch on the 
map translates into 62,360 inches or a scale of 1:62,360. Because 
this ratio holds for whatever units of dimension are used (i.e. , it 
is also true that 1 em. on the map corresponds to 62,360 em. in 
the landscape), the scale is again dimensionless. In this way the 
scale functions as a decoder or translator of distances. 
Of course, not everything is replicated on the map. For example, 
a roadmap is a poor tool for finding shade trees. Conversely, not 
everything on the map corresponds to the landscape; roadways 
are not really red in color. Yet every property relevant for travel 
(geometry, spatial relations, and distances) is represented. 
While the scale plays the role of decoder for the roadmap, 
other semantic models require other kinds of decoders. Three-
dimensional models of traffic accidents are sometimes built to help 
jurors conceptualize fault and right of way. But in these models not 
everything is to scale (e.g., the cars might be monstrously large). 
Or to take another example, some people may utilize a secret code 
when entering their private thoughts into a diary. In this case, the 
direction of the letter's sequence is preserved as well as the number 
of letters and grouping into sets. But the whole thing is gibberish 
until the key is known (e.g., A=Z, B= Y, etc.).5 
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Syntactical Modeling 
The second family of modeling is much larger than the first. S~nl 
tactical models differ from semantic models in at least two crucla 
h' h" an 
ways. First, very often syntactical models are "that by w iC . t 
object is known. 6 Obviously, scale models are calibrated aga'r;c 
an original. A juror can know truly relevant features of a tra d 
'd b d h · observe acc1 ent y stu ying a model, because t e properues t 
can be compared-at least in principle-with the original. Bu.~~­
every domain of knowledge has independent means for ve:l . 
. Th. . . f h penence. t10n. 1s 1s partiCularly true at the edges o uman ex d 
f t 9 an the very, very big, 7 the very very small, 8 the very, very as ' d 
h , b rience t e very, very unusual. 10 When the object cannot e expe b' ct 
directly, the model becomes the very means by which the 0 rke 
is "known." "Knowing" under these circumstances is morreh're 
" k. f h. I 11 e rna mg sense o "or "connecting with" everyt mg e se. a 
may be indirect evidence of the object (be it qualitative phenofen !I 
numerical data, and so on). But only by means of the mode iS ale 
evidence hoped to fit together. Max Black supplies an exarnPre 
f · · t l we 
rom atomic physics: "lnusing ... mode.ls, they [physJCIS s fheY 
not companng two domams from a posltlon neutral to both. ·rhe 
used language appropriate to the model in thinking about gh 
domain of application: they worked not by analogy, but throu 
and ~y mea.ns of an underlying analogy."12 . these 
It 1s a m1stake to imagine that someone m1ght clean up Jl. 
uncertainties at the edges and be done with them once and for :al 
For we are always at some edge of human experience, the t~111fo0the 
edge if no other. In other words, as human knowers mo~e '~ode!· 
~uture, new edges of experience are uncovered that reqUire ·dge, 
mg. For this reason, every civil engineering project-every b[' r tO 
dam, skyscraper-has yet-to-be-discovered properties pecula re 
h. H ~~, t 1s context, properties that impinge on design. ow mu d ca· 
h · h. f · ore u t en, 1s t 1s true or projects in politics or econom1cs 011 
tion.13 Consequently, human knowers are forever dependent 
syntactical modeling. . heS 
Th h d. ·0 gu1s e second feature of syntactical modeling t at 1st! dY 
it from semantic modeling is that human skill is not only ha~cu~ 
· · · d h. hl partl 1t 1s requtre .. Not skill-in-general, mind you, but 1g Y 
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lariz~d skill, the sort that sometimes requires years of training to 
~et nght. The dependence of syntactical modeling upon highly 
E eveloped skill can be illustrated with a page from the history of 
uropean engineering . 
. In 1905, Boltzmann warned that a small-scale flying machine 
~tght bear its own weight but fail to fly when scaled up.14 Al-~ ough Boltzmann wrote three years before the Wright brothers 
rought manned flight to Europe, the children in France had for 
some years played with a toy helicopter (really more of a "flying 
screw") designed by Alphonse Penaud.U A similar toy can still be 
fur~hased today. The helicopter's rotors generate enough speed 
or hft-off because of the ingenious rack-and-pinion gear arrange-
ment: the child pulls the foot-long strap (rack gear) quickly, the 
rotor turns and lifts the toy, keeping it aloft for flights of thirty ~0 f?rty feet, enough to clear the roof and get stuck in the neigh-
or s tree! The toy clearly shows that heavier-than-air flight was 
Possible. Now, if engineers follow the rule by which roadmaps 
;:e contrived-dimensionless similarity-they might scale up the 
.denaud flyer by a factor of, say, fifteen. This prototype will look 
1 
entical to the Penaud toy. But it will not fly. 
. While the strength of each part will have increased in propor-
tion to the cross-section of the members (F), the weight has gone 
Up by the cube of the linear dimensions (U) . In other words, the 
fhopel!ers are 15 times longer and 225 tim~s stronger (because 
ct· ey are both fifteen times wider and fifteen times thtcker [m two 
trections) than the propellers on the toy). But the whole thing 
7ezghs more than 3,000 times (i .e., 153) more than the toy! Even 
~ there were an energy source sufficient to offset the 3,000-fold 
Increase in weight by pulling the strap 3,000 times faster than the 
toy, the thing still would not fly. In the first place, if everything ~elevant is scaled up in the replica, air density should have also 
deen increased by the cube of the linear dimension. But since air en. 81ty has not been scaled up, the large model has to compen-
Shte by some combination of vastly increased speed and pitch of 
t e Propeller. (A correlative problem faces real helicopters that 
at Very high altitudes run into a ceiling above which they can-
not climb because they cannot get enough lift out of the rarified 
atmosphere.) Friction also becomes an enemy here-high speed 
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props do in fact bind, bend, break, and even melt. In short, the 
simple scale, 1:15, will not produce the kind of similarity needed 
for manned flight. 
In fact, no single dimensionless scale or parameter (e.g., "15") 
can regularize the functional differences that become enormously 
important when scaling up weight, strength, density, lift, and so 
on. To repeat, the large replica model is dimensionlessly similar 
~o the Penaud flyer, because it is geometrically congruent. But it 
ts dynamically dissimilar. For while the toy flies, the big version 
cannot. In contrast, a real helicopter (which took until the 1940s 
to perfect} is dynamically similar to the Penaud flyer, but it is di-
mensionlessly dissimilar. In other words, a real helicopter looks 
nothing like the toy, but it really does fly. 
The point is that dynamic similarity functions in quite con-
ceptually different ways than dimensionless similarity. Of course, 
engineers ordinarily do not stop to consider which concept of 
"similarity" they employ: as their skills for modeling increase, 
their use of dynamical similarity completely eclipses concern for 
dimensionless similitude. 
Bewitched by a Model 
Before I display the difference that dynamical similarity makes 
to discussions of evil, it is important to issue a warning: in our 
deep craving for explanation we forever tend toward reducing 
syntactical modeling to semantic modeling. This urge is apparent 
even in the empirical sciences. Take for example Clerk Maxwell's 
now classic attempt to understand an electric field by comparing it 
to a frictionless, non-compressible fluid as it were, moving through 
a sponge. He reports that his initial intentions were simply to come 
up with a pedagogical tool for more easily grasping the behavior 
of electric fields. He was well aware that his model "is not even a 
hypothetical fluid which was introduced to explain actual phenom-
ena. It [the model] is merely a collection of imaginary properties 
which may be employed for establishing certain theorems in pure 
mathematics in a way more intelligible to many minds." 16 
But Maxwell's teaching tool was so convincing that he became 
bewitched. Before long, Maxwell began to think of electric fields 
not merely "as if" they were fluids but "as being" fluids. 17 In other 
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Words, Maxwell came to regard his model as if it had a one-to-one 
correspondence of features like a scale model. 
Maxwell was not the only scientist to surrender to the tempta-
tion of confusing a syntactical model with a semantic one. Lord 
Kelvin, who insisted on finding mechanical models to explain 
Phenomena, 18 insisted that if light was a wave, then there must 
be a medium (called "the ether") through which light waves 
propagated themselves. Kelvin insisted, "We know the luminifer-
ous ether better than we know any other kind of matter in some 
particulars. We know it for its elasticity; we know it in respect to 
the constancy of the velocity of propagation of light for different 
periods .... Luminiferous ether must be a substance of the most 
extreme simplicity." 19 
Kelvin's mistake-for there is not such a thing as "luminiferous 
ether"-began the moment he forgot that waves were syntactical 
models of light and not its semantic definition. 
Were it possible to reduce syntactical modeling to semantic 
modeling the advantages would be obvious: semantic modeling 
is more accessible (and thus more persuasive to a wider audi-
ence) because it employs universal definitions and/or universally 
applicable translators (such as a scale). And sometimes the skill 
set required to do syntactical modeling becomes so widespread 
that it seems as though it were in fact semantic. Under these con-
ditions the model strikes the majority as self-evident, while the 
unconvinced are chided for being obtuse. But when the difference 
between semantic and syntactical modeling is forgotten, a deep 
confusion threatens to enter the conversation. 
Consider three pairs of statements. The first pair consists of 
a second-order partial differential equation: "82(xer sin1tz)/8y2 " 
and its non-obvious solution, "xeY sin1tz. "20 The second set pairs 
a sentence in French with two in German: 
[E]t les patriarches, et de qui est issu, selon Ia chair, le Christ, 
qui est au-dessus de toutes choses, Dieu beni eternellment. 
Sie sind die Nachkommen von Abraham, Isaak, und Jakob, 
und so gar Christus, der versprochene Retter, zi:ihlt nach seiner 
menschlichen Herkunft su ihnen. Fur all dies sei Gott, der 
Herr uber aile fur immer und ewig gepriesen!21 
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The third set is comprised of two identical sentences in English, 
one written using block letters in green ink, the second one usmg 
a cursive hand in red ink: 
(in green) Quick brown foxes jumped over the lazy 
dog. 
(in red) l2uic/i 6Jw.wn ~jumped CW-eJt t& ~ dag. 
For each pair, estimation of "similarity" is a function of human 
skill: the ability to do calculus, fluency in French and German, 
and the ability to read at all. 
Now, in the first case the estimation of sameness is thought 
to have a correct answe; Those who can do calculus can tell us 
whether and within what boundary conditions the equivalence 
holds. In the third case, the question of sameness turns on the 
question of respect, "In which respect is sameness to be measured~ 
color or font or meaning?" The respect at stake 1s related to th 
work the sentence is expected to do. If the purpose of the sentence 
is to detect color blindness then the "correct" answer is that they 
. , ~ 
are d1fferent. If the purpose is to test whether a youngster can Y. 
read cursive handwriting (or read at all), the "correct" answer IS 
that they are the same. Sighted adults possess the ability to esdmat~ 
sameness with respect both to color and meaning, and so nee 
clarification before answering. . 
The middle pair is more complicated and illustrates what IS 
meant by dynamical similarity. Granted, fluency in both langua~e~ 
lS reqlllred. But here "sameness" cannot be settled by phrase- Y 
phrase correspondence. After all there are only twenty-two words 
. , . . ~ 
used m the French sentence while the German uses thJrty-sJX· 
other words, there may be no objective measure of the sameness 
of the sentences. The question turns on who is speaking a~d ~0 
what use the sentences are being put. The question of similttu e 
will have to be argued out. Such arguments can be done poorly or 
11 d. . · · tWO we accor mg to the Interlocutors' skill sets. We can 1magme 
1 ·1· are mu tl mgual speakers. The first insists that the two sentences 
· · 11 · · all Y grammat1ca y allowable translations of Romans 9:5 (ongi~ f 
d . G bit o compose m reek). A wooden translation of the relevant 
Greek is something like: "the Christ according to the flesh the one 
being above all God." 22 
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The difference between the two versions is this: The French 
sentence virtually equates Christ and God. In contrast, the German 
Version uses a period that functions to bifurcate the identity of 
Christ from the identity of God . Deciding between the two is not a 
rnatter of finding the correct decoder. Not only is there no punctua-
tion in the Greek manuscript (ever!), the Greek is ambiguous as to 
Whether it is speaking of two persons (Christ and God) or just one 
Person (Christ, who is God) . Thus the second reader may respond 
in horror, because to her lights the German translation is heretical! 
The second reader is not simply preferring the French as one of two 
grammatically allowable translations, but judging it to be superior, 
Precisely because it more clearly identifies Christ and God as one 
Person. For her the French text is dynamically similar to the Greek 
teXt as per her doxastic and exegetical skills. In other words, the 
Greek nominative of apposition that leans toward the identification 
of Christ and God is not a knock-down argument proving early 
Christians worshiped Christ as God. But for those who have learned 
thus to worship, the French version is the expert's choice. 
But let me be clear. I am not claiming simply that the second 
reader has more skills than the first, making her the "expert." My 
Point is that dynamical similarity is a function of some skill or 
Other being in play. For her and her allies, the relevant practice-
engendered skill is worship. Obviously, one can easily imagine 
a rival skill possessed by the equally pious first reader by which 
the German passage can be shown to be dynamically similar to 
Greek text. For example, perhaps the first reader is a missionary 
~hose skill set includes cross-cultural communication. By his 
1tghts, the German passage is more easily accessible to a wider :'1 audience. Whichever direction the argument goes, a case for 
'Ynamic similarity turns on the presence of an actual person in 
q.ct'Lta/ possession of some relevant skill. For neither reader is the 
~,1lllilarity in question dimensionless, making the modeling an 
lln.skilled" enterprise. 
~ecalling the roadmap as an easy example of a scale model 
alld dimensionless similarity, I'm not claiming that no skills what-
~e.t are employed in the affirmation of dimensionless similitude. 
ather, my point is that shared skills often go unnoticed. This is 
teadily apparent in the third case. Children who cannot read can 
()tl.ly compare the string of colored shapes (i.e., the letters). Adults 
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who can read perform the act of syntactical modeling-which 
is to say they read both sentences so rapidly that the skill called 
"reading" is transparent. If no illiterate persons are in the room, 
readers tend to think that the meaning of each sentence is to be 
compared to the other in a dimensionless way and fail to notice 
other possible modes of comparison. But in point of fact, syntacti-
cal modeling is involved, albeit too rapidly to be noticed, unless a 
child is present to remind them of what they no longer notice. 
For some of those who are fluent in calculus, type one com-
parisons may also be rapid enough for the skill to be overlooked. 
Anytime the skills are transparent to the subject, one may be 
bewitched into taking the comparison as straightforward one-to-
one correspondence. Others who remember their calculus more 
dimly are painfully aware that the modeling involved is of the 
skill-based syntactical sort. If skilled judgment is necessary for 
these run of the mill examples, how much more in cases involving 
philosophical discernment? In other words, the activity of model-
ing is ubiquitous. Syntactical modeling is not unique to engineering 
or medicine or biblical studies but common to all practices and 
much of ordinary living. 
Applying Dynamical Similarity to the Problem of Evil · 
It should be clear that conversations in philosophy of religion 
are themselves instances of modeling. Consequently, it is easy for 
skilled philosophers and theologians to lose sight of the role that 
specialized skills play in their conversations. What to them seems 
to be semantic modeling is in fact syntactical modeling. I raise 
this point to warn against the wrong sort of application of a new 
concept (here, dynamical similarity). In short, we cannot simply 
replace dimensionless similarity in standard theodicies. To make 
this kind of a swap is like putting down the AAA map and pick-
ing up the Thompson Guide. In reality, it is more like picking up 
a topographical map, because using dynamical similarity is more 
like orienteering than driving to Grandma's. If we are to make 
the switch successfully, we will have to attend to what Wittgen-
stein called the "grammar" of the term. And as we might expect, 
dynamic similarity functions in quite conceptually different ways 
than dimensionless similarity. 
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It is sometimes overlooked that as an engineer Wittgenstein 
W~uld have been primarily interested in syntactical models .23 
Wittgenstein shows that he was primarily concerned with syntacti-
cal models and dynamical similarity (rather than mental models 
and dimensionless similarity) because like every other bright young 
e~gineer of the age, he wanted to solve the problems of manned 
air-flight! 24 Only after the Wright brothers brought manned flight 
to Europe did Wittgenstein turn his attention from aeronautical 
engineering to the foundations of mathematics and then to the 
philosophy of language. 
Here then is a crucial passage in the Tractatus, the book that 
he drafted while serving for the Austrian army on the front lines 
of World War I as a 29-year-old. He wrote: 
In the fact that there is a general rule by means of which 
the musician can obtain the symphony out of the score, 
and that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the 
symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from 
this again-by means of the first rule-construct the score, 
herein lies the internal similarity between these things which 
at first sight seem to be entirely different [i.e., dissimilar]. 
And that rule is the law of projection which projects the 
symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the 
rule of transmission [Vbersetzung] of this language into the 
language of the gramophone record. (4.0141)25 
What sort of similarity does Wittgenstein mean? And what kind 
of modeling does he have in mind when he talks about the " law 
of projection"? Surely the relationship of symphonic performance 
to musical score and again between symphonic performance and 
groove in the old-fashioned long-play (LP) vinyl record are prob-
lems much more like the problem of scaling up the Penaud flyer 
into a real helicopter than the roadmap replica. The difference 
is in the sort of modeling involved. In moving from performance 
to score, and performance to LP groove, the model is varied ac-
cording to conditions of the problem by means of the skills of 
the modeler. 26 
This method of projection is not a simple correspondence 
between models that share logical multiplicity only. Nor is this 
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the sort of translation that can be understood by the average car 
owner. Rather, this method of projection is a function of highly 
developed experience, savvy, and know-how. In short, the "proje~­
tion" of the played symphony onto a newly transcribed score IS 
internally related to the actual skill of the particular musician who 
is doing the transcription. Or again, if experior (a term used here 
to capture together the three notions of experiment, experience, 
and expertise) rather than mental models are involved, then the 
"pictorial internal relation" 27 does not describe the one-to-one 
correspondence of dimensionless similarity that can be traced 
between a city neighborhood and its two-dimensional reduction. 
Rather, the "pictorial relation" is internal to the conceptual world 
of the expert modeler. It refers to functional or dynamical similar-
ity. This kind of similarity cannot be assessed by mere spectators, 
because its prerequisite is actual human skill. Only through the 
fingers and ears of skilled musicians may the symphony be said 
to be "similar" to the score. The rest of us have to take the mu-
sician's word for it. (In Wittgenstein's case, the skilled musician 
may very well have been Johannes Brahms, who was a frequent 
visitor to the keyboard in Karl Wittgenstein's parlor! Then again 
it may have been Ludwig's brother Paul, for whom Maurice Ravel 
composed music!) . 
How then does Wittgenstein call this projection a "law"? 
Does "law" refer to a nomological pattern that holds whether or 
not anyone is looking? No. The "law" involved is not so much 
an objective regularity as an inter-subjective one; not so much 
a descriptive law as a prescriptive one. In other words, "law" 
connotes the fact that musical convention is regularized, for the 
practice of music is conventional and inter-subjective by nature. 
The skilled musician has been progressively trained-by intensive 
participation in the cooperative practice under the watchful eye of 
expert mentors over a long course of time-into a particular set of 
conventions surrounding musical notation and performance that 
can be discerned in the play of the experts. This training amounts 
to habituation in both tacit and verbal know-how. 
How then is this a "general rule"? It may be illuminating to read 
this phrase as an expression of the regularized training that musi-
cians receive. The rule in view, therefore, is not a one-size-fits-all 
DYNAMICAL SIMILARITY AND TT-IE PROBLEM OF EVIL 175 
fiat (as in "rules are made to be broken"), but rather an iterative 
training regimen, again akin to the rigors of medical residency or 
the forming of expert engineers.28 If the training regimens of doc-
tors and engineers and musical virtuosi are flat-out grueling, the 
kind of life-formation involved indicates that the "rule" in view 
is best thought of as a law governing the formation of novices as 
~n, for example, "The Rule of St. Benedict." If skill is involved 
IU projecting audio performance onto a musical score, a 'parallel 
claim can be made regarding the projection of a performance 
onto an LP groove. The projection from performance to LP passes 
through the skills, not of the musician this time, but that of a 
team of engineers. 29 
In light of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language, the 
"grammar" of a term relates to its skillful use within a form of life. 
This skill-in-context attunes the user to meaning and significance 
lost on others. To take a poignant example, hockey players and 
rabid fans are attuned through repetition of the respective bodily 
activities associated with playing and rooting. Both players' and 
~ans' brains "light up" when presented with ordinary sentences 
111 English that make particular sense in the context of a hockey 
game (such as "The shot hit the post."). The bodies of players 
and fans are in a ready state for action. In sharp contrast, people 
unfamiliar with hockey are far less disposed to attend to such 
sentences and often miss them entirely. To borrow a metaphor, 
players and fans have "ears to hear. "30 
What holds for hockey holds for other skill-intensive practices. 
To extend the engineering example, the notion of dynamical simi-
larity is a way of saying that skilled engineers "light up" when 
engaged in modeling; they pick up on significance lost to the rest 
of us. While the general population understands scale models (and 
semantic modeling in general), Wittgenstein observed that the 
skilled practitioner sees not only the semantic similarity between, 
say, a technical drawing of a mechanism and a built prototype; 
the skilled engineer is also attuned to other conditions crucial to 
the achievement of dynamical similarity such as the play between 
socket and pin, that is, the pin not fitting "too tight" (how tight is 
that?), and the possibility of the parts binding, bending, melting, 
breaking, and so on.3 1 
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Wittgenstein associated the skilled participation in a form 
of life that is prerequisite for right usage of concepts with the 
"grammar" of the word. Of course, Wittgenstein did not reserve 
grammatical treatment for only technical terms. Even the rnos~ 
mundane concept is bound up with human activity: "It is p~rt_ 0 
the grammar of the word 'chair' that this [spoken while sltnn_g 
down] is what we call 'to sit on a chair.' " 32 Nevertheless, 1~ 1~ 
the particularized skills that interest me in the use of "dynarnlca 
similarity" in theology. . " 
. Negati~ely put, the usefulness of "dyna~ica,~ sim,!lant~e 
m d1scuss10ns of evil is to trumpet a resoundmg No! to I 
temptation to compare divine agency to human agency m mere~ s~m.ant~c terms. If it makes sense to appeal ins;ead to ~ynarn;~:e 
stmllanty, then it is reasonable to say that Gods actwn IS not . 
human action albeit bigger, stronger, faster. Recall that eve~ 1~ 
the provenance of engineering per se, the difficulty of extrapo a 
· f · f hurnao 
mg rom what we know in the center to the margms o b 
. . b use t e 
expenence cannot be done by simple scale expanswn, eca 1 e 
rules change at the margins. Engineers cannot say with abso ut,, 
cer;,ainty whether the ~ext "tallest ?uilding, '~ "long~~t bn~~e;Js 
or b1ggest cannon" will not fail. If 1t does fatl, 1ts fathng re .. g 
. 1 d qulno 
some prev10usly undetected ceiling to our know e ge re 5 
· eer 
syntactical modeling to make the next breakthrough. If engln d 
must be cautions at the margins, I claim that philosophers an 
theologians ought to be more so. -
Positively speaking, dynamical similarity has widespread P~~s 
cedence. Clearly drama, poetry, and story-telli~g are exa~~ate 
of syntactiCal modeling (as is evident by the phght of desp. ') 
h · . eruse · · sop omores who thmk Chff Notes are a short-cut to exp bY 
But perhaps a more relevant theological example is hinted at be 
. . JJ . tO t Aqumas. As 1s well known, Aquinas was loath to fa ll1 de ~rap ~f ~'onto-th~ology"-the mistake Duns Scotus later ::rid 
m clat~mg a u~tvoc1ty of being share? by God and_ the 00Jy (~ffect1vely makmg God a piece of furmture m the umver;;•rbus 
b1gger, stronger, smarter, and faster than anyone else). . ,5 
A 
. . . wnte• 
qumas, together with a sizeable portion of the Chnsuan je 
who preceded him, vehemently denied the possibility o~ a sc;ut 
model of God .34 This seems like it should be a no-bramer. 
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as David Burrell notes, both sides of the contemporary theodicy 
debate are tacitly committed to this very error.35 
In contr::tst to modern theodicists, Aquinas follows the hints of 
Augustine ind Pseudo-Dionysius and suggests that we understand 
a categoric::tl difference between proportion (proportio, i.e., scale) 
and "prop<lrtionateness" (proportionalitem). This latter term is a 
~rt ?f se,COnd-order analogy of analogy represented by A:B;:C:D.36 
fumas s .~xample is that the relationship of the sun to the physi-
~ world 1\ akin to the relationship of God to the spiritual world. 
(f 0 propo~tion or scales can be set up between the sun and God 
0~ there 15 no shared property enabling direct comparison, such 
~s ~at). 1'-revertheless, the analogy is intelligible. I concur with 
~n amse·~'s conclusion that the model both discloses something 
~ l out Go~'s relationship to the world and that the model we em-
th oy to thu1k this is itself inherently limitedY (And perhaps only 
t e ve~y sk.il1ed may be attuned to the limits of the model.) As a 
entat1ve e· k s· .1Cample, I offer the work of Arthur Peacoc e. 
Po 
1dncehh1s 1978 Bampton Lectures, Arthur Peacocke has pro-
se t at d. . b d . h d 1. 
exercised ~ lVl~e agency e compare ~It topd- own causa 1ty 
ru 38 I . y a h1gher rung on a mereolog1cal or er upon a lower 
strng.h tf1s well known that in the mereological hierarchy that 
etc es . 
run rom the sub-atomic to the planet as a whole, lower 
gs exer b . £1 h' h f . . (fo t ottom-up m uence on 1g er rungs o orgamzatwn 
or:a e~a~}le, a chemical imbalance affects the operation of the 
that n .' te biochemist-become-theologian Peacocke observed 
lt IS eq 11 h d . . h. h at each 1 ua y true t at non-re uct1ve properties, w 1c emerge levels . evh~l of complexity, exercise downward influence on lower 
111 t h' h 39 Pea 1 e 1erarc y. Poses ~c :e's model may be taken as syntactical in that he pro-
causal alt God's relation to creation is dynamically similar to the 
rea. b . d h . . Parts 0 t10n etween emergent propert1es an t e1r constituent Ptop~rtine advantage of this kind of comparison is that emergent 
that thisesfare unpredictable, even "chaotic."40 One might. think 
Press the act would spare human modelers the temptatwn to 
on the m;wdel in a semantic direction in hopes of getting a bead 
the sema ihanism of divine agency. Despite the unpredictability, tnfluence~;ic temptation can still get a grip if God's "top-down" l , 
:taken to be "upon" something "external" to the divine 
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action. The problem is that the classical theological grammar of 
"simplicity" and "necessity" means that it makes no sense to speak 
of anything being external to divine activity. 41 While champions 
of Peacocke's model sometimes drift in a semantic direction,4: rhe 
syntactical nature of modeling means that what is really needed is 
greater skill in attending to the limits of modeling. Thus my ap-
peal to the syntactical nature of modeling is meant both to esc!leW 
the errors of "scale model" thinking and throw up a cautionarY 
reminder that modelers attend to the inherent limits of analogical 
reasoning. Admittedly, this caution may be a grave disappoinrnent 
to theodicists who want advance guarantees that models achieve 
the sought-for similarity. But their disappointment does not niake 
syntactical modeling any less demanding. . 
1 To recap my main contention, as an instance of syntacnca 
modeling analogical reasoning in theology has inherent limit~ that 
are not fixable flaws in the model qua model. Rather the lunJtS 
are internally related to ever-imperfect human skills. Whether we 
are considering engineering, music, or theology, modeling hap?e~~ 
only where there have been modelers, plural. Those who have go 
before put the novices through the training paces. As could be seen 
in Wittgenstein's case, dynamical similarity became attainab!ebY 
engineering modelers who had undergone extensive bodily traJOJJlg 
(technical drawing, building prototypes, lab work, on-site v:~~~: 
~nd so on). Theol?gy is no different. Progress in the art of mo vid 
mg comes at a pnce.43 In a recent interchange theologian Da 
' · her Burrell expresses exasperation at the tin ear of the ph1loso? , 
with whom he debates. The philosopher insists that God "ex:stsJI 
· · 1 h h 'l B rre m preCJse Y t e same univocal way that creatures do, w 1 e u b 
has been trying to show that such an existent could not then e 
whom we mean by "God." At the end of the day, Burrell suggests 
that what his interlocutor needs is not more evidence, arguments, 
or facts but more (syntactical modeling) skills: 
How do we gain such adeptness? There is only one answer: 
through practice; but it must also be acknowledged that sonie 
never do! That suggests that we are in the realm of judg-
~ent here, for judgme~t gives some the ability to dir~ct a
1
n 
madequate concept to 1ts target whereas others wtll s1mp.Y 
allow it to mislead them. Yet ~ith such practices we are 
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entering that way of doing philosophy ... which modernity, 
preoccupied with finding adequate [ dimensionlessly similar] 
concepts, has simply overlooked.44 
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